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CASE COMMENTS

duty of care upon a social host.53 This alteration of traditional tort
doctrine means that a family extending its hospitality gratuitously may
now be liable for unknown dangers which pose as great a threat to the
host family as to its guests. 54 Moreover, relatives residing apart from the
host household now enjoy a privileged status denied residents of the
household.5 5 By making hosts as liable to their social guests as merchants are to their customers, Wood pits guest against host (or, more
likely, both against an insurance company), while putting uninvited
visitors at their peril.

Criminal Law-FLORIDA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS NEITHER SIGNED BY NOR DIRECTLY QUOTING A DECLAR-

ARE NOT DISCOVERABLE "STATEMENTS" WITHIN RULE 3.220.State v. Latimore, 284 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973), cert.
denied, 291 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1974).
ANT

One week after James Latimore was charged with second degree
murder, his defense counsel filed a motion for pretrial discovery of all
police reports compiled in connection with the charge. In its order
granting the motion and compelling discovery, the trial court ruled
that "all police reports are 'statements' within the meaning of Rule
3.220(a)(1)(ii), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure."' Rather than
comply with this order, the State sought review by writ of certiorari to
the Third District Court of Appeal. The Third District granted the
State's petition and quashed the trial court's order, holding that

53. See 284 So. 2d at 696. See also Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43, 51 (Mass. 1973).
54. In Peterson v. Balach, 199 N.W.2d 639 (Minn. 1972), the head of a household,
his young daughter and her young house guest all died in their sleep from carbon
monoxide poisoning resulting from failure to maintain a gas refrigerator line. The estate
of the house guest was allowed recovery from the estate of the head of the household.
55. In Phillips v. Phillips, 287 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973), the court,
following Wood, ruled that a seven-year-old boy was an invited social guest upon the
premises of his grandfather and hence an invitee. Cf. Peterson v. Balach, 199 N.W.2d
639 (Minn. 1972), where the daughter's house guest had a cause of action against the
father but the daughter presumably did not.
1. The trial court's ruling is stated in State v. Latimore, 284 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 291 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1974).
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police and other investigation reports which do not quote a person
S.. directly and never are signed or shown to that person are not
statements within [Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220
2
(a)(l)(ii)] and thus are not subject to discovery thereunder.
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(a) provides that the
prosecution must disclose to the defense the "statements" of any person
"known to the prosecutor to have information which may be relevant
to the offense charged, and to any defense with respect thereto." The
rule then defines "statement" as
a written statement made by said person and signed or otherwise
adopted or approved by him, or a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcript thereof, or which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by said person
to an officer or agent of the State and recorded contemporaneously
with the making of such oral statement . ...
In State v. Latimore5 the Third District became the first Florida appellate court to interpret this definition as applied to police reports. 6
The court undertook a three part analysis in interpreting the rule.
2. 284 So. 2d at 425.
3 FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(a) provides in part:
(1) After the filing of the indictment or information, within fifteen days after written demand by the defendant, the prosecutor shall disclose to defense counsel and
permit him to inspect, copy, test and photograph, the following information and
material within the State's possession or control:
(i) The names and addresses of all persons known to the prosecutor to have
information which may be relevant to the offense charged, and to any defense
with respect thereto.
(ii) The statement of any person whose name is furnished in compliance with
the preceding paragraph. The term "statement" as used herein means a written
statement made by said person and signed or otherwise adopted or approved by
him, or a stenographic, mechanical, electrical or other recording, or a transcript
thereof, or which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by
said person to an officer or agent of the State and recorded contemporaneously with
the making of such oral statement, provided, however, if the court determines in
camera (sic] proceedings as provided in subsection (i) hereof that any police report
contains irrelevant, sensitive information or information interrelated with other
crimes or criminal activities and the disclosure of the contents of such police report
may seriously impair law enforcement or jeopardize the investigation of such other
crimes or activities, the court may prohibit or partially restrict such disclosure. The
court shall prohibit the State from introducing in evidence the material not disclosed, so as to secure and maintain fairness in the just determination of the cause.
4. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(a)(1)(ii).
5. 284 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 291 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1974).
6. Id. at 424. The present Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure were adopted by the
Florida Supreme Court on December 6, 1972, and became effective February 1, 1973. See
In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1972).
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An inquiry into legislative history revealed that the rule's definition of
"statement" was derived from the Jencks Act. 7 The court therefore
looked to federal court decisions interpreting that Act,8 and concluded
that the Jencks Act definition of statement generally had been inare a substantial [sic] verterpreted to mean "those statements which
9
batim recital of the witness' own words."
Next the court reviewed "available Florida law" on the issue of
discovery of police reports. 10 The court noted that prior to the adoption of rule 3.220 defendants had been denied access to police reports
7. 284 So. 2d at 424. The Jencks Act provides in part:
In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement or report
in the possession of the United States which was made by a Government witness
or prospective Government witness (other than the defendant) shall be the subject
of subpoena, discovery, or inspection until said witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the case.
18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1970). For further discussion of the Jencks Act see notes 15-21, 25, 33
and accompanying text infra.
The court stated that the rule itself, rather than only the definition of "statement,"
was derived from the Jencks Act. This seems erroneous. The 1972 Committee Note
to the rule indicates that it was taken substantially from Standard 2.1 of ABA PROJECT
ON MINIMUM

STANDARDS

FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

STANDARDS

RELATING To DISCOVERY AND

(Tent. Draft, May 1969) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS]; only the definition of "statement" came from the Jencks Act. See SPECIAL ADVISORY
PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL
COMMITrEE

OF THE FLORIDA

SUPREME COURT, PROPOSED

REVISION

OF FLORIDA CIMINAL

PROCEDURE RULES at 67-69 (1972) fhereinafter cited as PROPOSED REVISION].
8. See 284 So. 2d at 424. One of the United States Supreme Court decisions considered
by the court was Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959), the first Supreme Court
determination of the scope and meaning of the Jencks Act. In Palermo a Government
agent had prepared a memorandum of a conference with a Government witness. After
that witness testified at trial, the defense sought disclosure of the agent's memorandum
under the Jencks Act. All nine members of the Court agreed that the memorandum did
not meet the Act's definition of a statement. The Court stressed that
is clear that Congress [in enacting the Jencks Act] was concerned that only those
[i]t
statements which could properly be called the witness' own words should be made
available to the defense for purposes of impeachment.
360 U.S. at 352. The Court went on to state that
summaries of an oral statement which evidence substantial selection of material, or
which were prepared after the interview without the aid of complete notes, and
hence rest on the memory of the agent, are not to be produced. Neither, of course,
are statements which contain the agent's interpretations or impressions.
360 U.S. at 352-53.
9. 284 So. 2d at 424. The court's conclusion is supported by the authority it cites.
See, e.g., Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 352 (1959) (discussing congressional emphasis on "substantially verbatim" requirement); United States v. Graves, 428 F.2d 196,
200 (5th Cir. 1970) (must be substantially verbatim recital of witness' oral statements
made to a Government agent which are recorded contemporaneously with the making
of the statement). However, the court failed to consider those federal decisions holding
that the report itself may be a Jencks Act "statement" of the agent/officer who compiled
the report. See notes 28-29 and accompanying text infra. See generally Annot., 5 A.L.IR.3d
763 (1966).
10. See 284 So. 2d at 424.
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both on policy grounds", and because such reports were held to con2
stitute work product of the prosecution.1

11. Id. The court cited Scott v. State, 207 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968), as
authority for the proposition that defendants are not entitled to the production of police
reports. In Scott the defendant had moved for production of police reports containing the
statements of a State witness which allegedly could have been used for impeachment
purposes. The trial court denied the motion, and on appeal the Second District dismissed the issue with the statement that "[t]he withholding of production to defense
counsel of the police report has been settled adversely to defendant in several cases." Id.
at 498.
Scott relied upon prior decisions denying the defendant the right to discovery. In the
first of these, McAden v. State, 21 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1945), the defense had moved that a
subpoena duces tecum issue to a court reporter and several State Attorneys, requiring them to produce the testimony and notes taken at all hearings and investigations
concerning the offense charged. The defense particularly desired access to transcripts of
testimony taken at certain hearings, which were alleged to contain contradictory testimony
given by several witnesses. The trial court overruled the motion, and on appeal the
supreme court affirmed:
The courts of last resort of other States have ruled on similar questions in the
absence of a controlling statute. Search of the authorities . . . has been made and
the cases generally hold that defendant's counsel in a criminal case is not entitled
to a transcript of testimony of State witnesses taken before a prosecuting officer
preparatory to trial.
21 So. 2d at 36. In State v. Lampp, 155 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1963), the trial
court had ordered that a subpoena ad testificandum issue to State witnesses compelling
them to appear before defense counsel and be deposed. On appeal, the Second District
recognized that "the purpose of taking the depositions . . . was to obtain pre-trial discovery as in civil actions," and quashed the trial court's order on the ground that "[the
order . . . depart[ed] . . . from the established practice and the public policy of the

State .... " 155 So. 2d at 14. The rationale of McAden and Lampp was followed in State
v. McCall, 186 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1966), wherein the court held that the
defendant was not entitled to the production of transcribed statements made by State
witnesses prior to trial.
The Florida Supreme Court recently relied upon Scott in denying access to police reports. See Williams v. State, 285 So. 2d 13, 16 (Fla. 1973). However, just one week later in
State v. Johnson, 284 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1973), the supreme court rejected what it termed
the "total refusal to produce [police reports] for any purpose in Scott," and held that
under certain circumstances such reports must be produced at trial for use by the defense in impeaching State witnesses. 284 So. 2d at 201. Although Scott was not expressly
overruled, it no longer stands for the proposition stated in Latimore. See notes 37-45 and
accompanying text infra, discussing the impact of Williams and Johnson on the Latimore
decision.
Application of rule 3.220 to the factual situations presented in McAden, Lampp and
McCall should result in compelling discovery of the information denied to the defendants
in those cases. Even under the Latimore interpretation of the rule's definition of "statement," the transcribed testimony of State witnesses in McAden and the statements in
McCall should be discoverable under subsection (a)(1)(ii). Subsection (d), which grants the
defense the right to depose "any person who may have information relevant to the offense
charged," is in direct conflict with the decision in Lampp. This brief analysis of the effect
of the rule on these decisions raises the question of how much influence prior case law
should have had on the court's interpretation of rule 3.220.
12. 284 So. 2d at 424-25. In suggesting that police reports may not be discoverable
because they are protected by the "work product" doctrine, Latimore relied upon Darrigo
v. State, 243 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1971), and State v. Gillespie, 227 So. 2d
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Finally, the court turned to the rule itself and concluded that the
meaning of "statement" was clear from its language. 8 The court read
the rule's definition of "statement" literally and held that "statements"
includes only: (1) those statements that are written and signed by the
person who made the statement; or (2) those oral statements that are
made to an officer or agent of the State and which are recorded by him
in substantially verbatim form contemporaneously with the making of
the statement.'
By interpreting the definition of "statement" in rule 3.220 as federal courts have interpreted that definition in the Jencks Act, the court
ignored the major distinction between the Act and the rule. The Jencks
Act was the congressional response to Jencks v. United States,'5 in which
the United States Supreme Court held that the defendant in a federal
criminal prosecution was entitled to inspect statements made by Government witnesses to Government agents.' 6 The Act was enacted 7 to
550 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969). Gillespie viewed the reports of agents of the prosecution as "examples of 'work product' in its purest and narrowest sense, to which the accused is not ordinarily entitled." 227 So. 2d at 557. However, the court went on to suggest that the Jencks Act might require that the reports be "made available to the accused at trial for purposes of effective cross-examination within the scope of the right of
confrontation." Id. The court later recognized that, in a case where the Jencks Act would
compel disclosure of the report at trial, "it is well within the court's discretion to compel
inspection thereof before trial if it appears that by doing so both time and effort would
be conserved to the advantage of the court and all concerned." 227 So. 2d at 559. It seems
that under the rationale in Gillespie, the Latimore court's discussion of the "work
product" doctrine was irrelevant since it is recognized that if a report is otherwise subject
to disclosure under the Jencks Act, the fact that it may be considered "work product"
does not prevent disclosure. See United States v. Hilbrich, 341 F.2d 555, 557 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 941 (1965); Saunders v. United States, 316 F.2d 346, 349-50 (D.C.
Cir. 1963).
An apparent limitation on the scope of the "work product" doctrine is found in subsection (c)(l) of rule 3.220, which provides:
Disclosure shall not be required of legal research or of records, correspondence,
reports or memoranda, to the extent that they contain the opinions, theories, or
conclusions of the prosecuting or defense attorney, or members of his legal staff.
This provision seems to exclude police reports from the category of "work product" protected by the rule.
In Darrigo the Second District approved the trial court's refusal to compel disclosure
of police officers' informal notes regarding certain statements against interest made by the
defendant on the ground that the notes were "work product." 243 So. 2d at 173. Subsection (a)(l)(iii) of rule 3.220, which provides that the prosecution must disclose "the substance of any oral statements made by the accused and known to the prosecutor," should
result in discovery under these same facts.
13. 284 So. 2d at 425.
14.

15.
16.
reports
defense

Id.

353 U.S. 657 (1957).
Id. The Government witnesses were paid informants who had made periodic
of the defendant's activities to the FBI. After the witnesses had testified, the
moved for an order compelling the Government to produce the reports for in-
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allay fears that this decision would pose a threat to national security
by allowing inspection of confidential information and vital state
secrets."' The stated purposes of the Act are to preserve the defendant's
right to due process of law, and "to guard the files of the Government
against a fishing expedition, against the examination in the hope of
finding something of an impeachable nature against the revelation
of matters dealing with other cases, which are not relevant to the case
at issue."1" In order to accomplish these objectives, discovery is limited
21
to those statements which can be used for impeachment purposes.
Therefore, only those statements which relate to the subject matter of
the witness' testimony on direct examination are subject to discovery
21
under the Jencks Act.
In contrast, the purpose of rule 3.220 is to provide for pretrial discovery by both the prosecution and the defense.2 2 The rule emphasizes
spection and use on cross-examination. The Supreme Court rejected the prior rule that
the trial court had discretion to deny inspection if the reports were not used in court by
the witness, and held:
[T]he petitioner was entitled to an order directing the Government to produce for
inspection all reports of [the witnesses] in its possession, written and, when orally
made, as recorded by the F.B.I., touching the events and activities as to which they
testified at the trial. We hold, further, that the petitioner is entitled to inspect the
reports to decide whether to use them in his defense. Because only the defense is
adequately equipped to determine the effective use for purpose of discrediting the
Government's witness and thereby furthering the accused's defense, the defense
must initially be entitled to see them to determine what use may be made of them.
Justice requires no less.
Id. at 668-69 (footnote omitted).
17. The day after Jencks was decided, legislation designed to combat the "Jencks
problem" was introduced in the House of Representatives. See 103 CoNG. REC. 8327 (1957).
The Jencks Act was approved Sept. 2, 1957. See Act of Sept. 2, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-269,
71 Stat. 595 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970)).
18. Mr. Justice Clark's dissent in Jencks called attention to this "problem":
Unless the Congress changes the rule announced by the Court today, those
intelligence agencies of our Government engaged in law enforcement may as well
close up shop, for the Court has opened their files to the criminal and thus afforded him a Roman holiday for rummaging through confidential information as
well as vital national secrets.
353 U.S. at 681-82. See aLso Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 346 (1959); 103 CoNG.
REc. 8290 (1957) (remarks of Representative Keating).
19. 103 CoNC. REC. 15782 (1957) (remarks of Senator O'Mahoney).
20. The legislative history shows that this was the intent of Congress. See 103 CONC.
REc. 15,782 (1957) (remarks of Senators Ervin and O'Mahoney). Federal case law has given
effect to this intent. See, e.g., Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959); United States
v. Harris, 458 F.2d 670 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 888 (1972); United States v.
Graves, 428 F.2d 196 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 US. 960 (1970).
21. The "related to the subject matter" requirement is stated in subsection (b) of
the Jencks Act. See note 33 infra.
22. The present Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure are the result of the recommendations of a special advisory committee formed pursuant to an order of the Florida
Supreme Court of March 23, 1970. The purpose of the committee was to review the
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facilitation, rather than limitation, of discovery and is structured to
permit discovery at any time after the filing of the indictment or information2s By providing for in camera proceedings in which the court
can prohibit or partially restrict disclosure of irrelevant or sensitive information,2' 4 the rule avoids the problem that the Jencks Act attempted
to resolve. Thus, there is no apparent necessity for limiting discovery
under rule 3.220 to only those "statements" which would be subject to
disclosure under the Jencks Act.
Subsection (e) of the Jencks Act defines a witness's "statement" as:
(1) a written statement made by said witness and signed or otherwise
adopted or approved by him;
(2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a
transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an
oral statement made by said witness and recorded contemporaneously
with the making of such oral statement; or
a transcription thereof,
(3) a statement, however taken or recorded, or
25
if any, made by said witness to a grand jury.
The definition of "statement" in rule 3.220 is essentially the same but
26
does not include grand jury testimony and is not subdivided. The
2
federal courts often refer to "(e)(1)" or "(e)(2)" Jencks Act statements.
28 a Fourth Circuit decision involving "(e)(l)"
Holmes v. United States,
statements, illustrates the significance of this distinction. In Holmes an
FBI agent had testified at trial as a witness for the Government. In
holding that the defendant was entitled to all memoranda and reports

Florida criminal procedure rules and make recommendations for their revision. The
order directed the committee to give careful consideration to ABA STANDARDS with a view
toward implementation of the Project's suggestions. The 1972 Committee Note to rule
3.220 acknowledges that the committee approved the substance of the philosophy behind
the ABA standards, a philosophy which resulted in the proposal of "more permissive discovery practices for criminal cases than is provided by applicable law in any jurisdiction
in the United States." ABA STANDARDS 1. The discussion of the origin of the rules was
taken from PRoPosED REvISION 7.
23. See FLA. R. CiM. P. 3.220(a)(1).
24. See FLA. R. CiuM. P. 3.220(a)(1)(ii). FLA. R. CiuM. P. 3.220(1) provides in part:
"Upon request of any person, the court may permit any showing of cause for denial or
regulation of disclosures, or any portion of such showing to be made in camera."
25. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e) (1970). Subsection (3) was added in 1970.
26. Compare FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(a)(l)(ii) with 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e) (1970). Note that
the statements of any person who has information that may be relevant to the offense
charged are discoverable under rule 3.220, whereas only the statements of witnesses are
subject to disclosure under the Jencks Act. See note 3 supra.
27. See, e.g., United States v. Graves, 428 F.2d 196, 199 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 960 (1970).
28. 271 F.2d 635 (4th Cir. 1959).
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that the agent had compiled during his investigation of the case, the
court observed that
[t]he written report of the agent... is just as much a verbatim statement of the agent, who prepares it, as a written statement of an informer, incorporated in the report, is the statement of the informer.
It is a statement within the literal and evident meaning of ... the

Act.2 9

Holmes indicates that all police reports are potentially "(e)(1)" statements under the Jencks Act.
Implicit in the Latimore court's finding that all police reports are
not "statements" within the meaning of rule 3.220 is the view that a
police report can never be considered the "statement" of the police
officer who authors the report.30 This view is expressed in the court's
holding that those police reports which do not directly quote a "person"
under rule 3.220 are not statements within the meaning of that rule.
Applying the Holmes rationale, however, any police officer who has
information that may be relevant to the offense charged is a "person"
whose "statement" must be furnished by the prosecutor upon the
written demand of the defense.31 Since a police report is a "written
statement" made by the officer and "signed or otherwise adopted or
'32
approved by him,"
it comes within a literal reading of the rule's

definition of "statement." The court's more restrictive interpretation
results from its failure to recognize that the report itself, as well as the
statement of a third person, can be an "(e)(l)" statement under federal
case law. 83 Holmes points up this basic weakness in the court's analysis
29. Id. at 638 (emphasis added). For discussion of other cases dealing with the statements of a Government agent see United States v. Berry, 277 F.2d 826, 829-30 (7th Cir.
1960); Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 763, 787-91 (1966).
30. See 284 So. 2d at 425.
31. See FLA. R. Cium. P. 3.220(a)(1)-(1)(i).
32. See FLA. R. CiM. P. 3.220(a)(1)(ii).
33. Only one of the federal cases considered by the Latimore court involved "(e)()"
statements: United States v. Graves, 428 F.2d 196 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 960
(1970). The court cited Graves to support the proposition that "reports which do not
quote a witness directly and never signed [sic] nor shown to that witness are not subject
to discovery under" the Jencks Act. 284 So. 2d at 424. Graves recognized that an agent's
report may be an "(e)(l)" statement but refused disclosure on the ground that the statement was not "directly related" to the subject matter to which the agent testified on
direct examination. 428 F.2d at 199-200. As an additional requirement for disclosure
under the Jencks Act, subsection (b) of the Act provides in part:
After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct examination, the
court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States to produce any
statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in the possession of the United
States which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified.
18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1970) (emphasis added).
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and demonstrates that, even if it is assumed that the definition of "statement" in rule 3.220 should be given the same interpretation as that
given to the Jencks Act definition, the result reached in Latimore still
might not be warranted.
By using Florida case law established prior to adoption of rule 3.220
as persuasive authority for its narrow interpretation, the court seemed
to overlook the purpose of the rule. While it is true that Florida courts
have held that the defendant is not entitled to discovery of police reports,3' 4 those decisions should have little relevance to an interpretation
of the current rule. Since rule 3.220 embodies significant changes in
the prior criminal discovery rule, 35 it is only appropriate that its interpretation be based upon the policy behind these changes,3 6 rather
than upon the concept of discovery as it existed prior to the new rule's
adoption. The Latimore court's interpretation represents the least
possible departure from earlier Florida case law that is consistent with
the language of rule 3.220, and demonstrates the court's reluctance to
move toward the more liberal criminal discovery contemplated by the
rule.
Two Florida Supreme Court decisions subsequent to the Third
District's decision in Latimore are relevant to a discussion of the issue
of discovery of police reports and cast doubt on the court's interpretation of rule 3.220. In Williams v. State87 the trial court denied a
motion for production of the prior statement of a State witness, for
impeachment purposes, after she had testified on direct examination.
The supreme court held that the trial court did not commit reversible
error by denying defendant's motion because the statement "was available to the defendant as a public record and, because the defendant
made no reasonable effort to procure [it] from the police . . . .,38 The
court's conclusion that police reports are public records was based on
Mahone v. State, 9 a Third District decision holding that police reports
are public records.40
34. See note 12 supra.
35. See 1972 Committee Note to FLA. R. CRM. P. 3.220, in PROPOSED REVISION 67-69.
36. The Special Advisory Committee Report to the Florida Supreme Court indicates
that the purpose for the rule change was to "improve the administration of criminal
justice." PROPOSED REvISION 8. See notes 60-66 and accompanying text infra.
37. 285 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1973).
38. Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
39. 222 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
40. In Mahone the defendant had moved for pretrial discovery of the report of the
arresting officer, the police record and certain FBI records. His motion was granted only
in part, and on appeal he asserted that he was entitled to all of the records. The court
dismissed this point with the statement that
[i]t has been held that the items mentioned in the argument under this point are
public records and that an appellant may not claim error in the absence of a show.
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While Williams did not involve pretrial discovery under rule 3.220,
the supreme court's adoption of the Mahone holding seems more consistent with a liberal view of discovery than the restrictive approach
taken by the Latimore court. The fact that Mahone was a Third District decision raises the question of why the same court that held police
reports to be public records would deny discovery of police reports
under rule 3.220. Indeed, in Latimore itself the Third District referred
to the reports in question as "public records."" 1

ing that he made a reasonable effort and was unable to procure the records.
Id. at 772.
The Mahone court referred to Florida's public records statute, which provides in part:
All state, county and municipal records shall at all times be open for a personal
inspection of any citizen of Florida, and those in charge of such records shall not
refuse this privilege to any citizen.
FLA. STAT. § 119.01 (1973). "Public records" is defined as "all documents . . . made or
received pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official
business by any agency," FLA. STAT. § 119.011(1) (1973). and "agency" is defined as "any
state, county or municipal officer, department or division . . . or other separate unit of
government created or established by law." FLA. STAT. § 119.011(2) (1973). A literal reading of these sections would include police reports in the definition of public records and
subject them to personal inspection by any Florida citizen. Certain public records, however, are exempted from public inspection:
All public records which presently are deemed by law to be confidential or which
are prohibited from being inspected by the public, whether provided by general
or special acts of the legislature or which may hereafter be so provided, shall be
exempt from the provisions of this section.
FiA. STAT. § 119.07(2)(a) (1973) (emphasis added). Although there is no statute that
specifically exempts police reports from inspection, the Florida Attorney General has taken
the position that "certain police records are exempt from public inspection because they
have been deemed by the common law to be records that must be kept secret, and thus
'presently are deemed by law to be confidential."' 1972 FLA. ATr'v GF.N. Op. 072-168, at
281 (emphasis added). The Attorney General's opinion was based in part on Lee v.
Beach Publishing Co., 173 So. 440 (Fla. 1937), in which the Florida Supreme Court stated:
"The right of inspection does not extend to all public records or documents, for
public policy demands that some of them, although of a public nature, must be
kept secret and free from common inspection, such for example as diplomatic correspondence and letters and dispatches in the detective police service or otherwise
relating to the apprehension and prosecution of criminals."
173 So. at 442, quoting from 23 R.C.L. Records at 161 (1929). The Attorney General has
distinguished between "[i]nvestigative police reports and records made in connection with
an official police investigation of a suspected violation of the law, or otherwise relating to
the detection, apprehension or prosecution of criminals," and "such matters as a police
officer's accident report, records of arrest (excluding those relating to juvenile offenses),
and business records of a municipal police department." 1972 FEA. ATr'y GEN. Op.072-168,
at 280. For other statements of the Attorney General's position on this issue see 1973 FtA.
Arr'v GEN. Op.073-166 (confirming the position taken in 1972 FLA. ATr'y GEN. Op. 072168 but noting that the police report exception to the public records statute is a narrow
one); 1957 FLA. Arr'y GEN. Op. 057-157 (sheriff's investigative files and complaint records
not open to public inspection).
41. 284 So. 2d at 425.
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In the more recent decision of State v. Johnson, the defendant
had been denied access to a police report sought for use in impeaching
a State witness.4 3 The supreme court affirmed reversal by the First District and recognized that the defendant has the right to production of
police reports at trial in certain limited circumstances." The supreme
court specifically rejected the prior case law relied upon by Latimore,
which had held that the defendants were not entitled to the production
of police reports.4 5 Thus, although Johnson did not involve pretrial
discovery under the rule, its recognition of the defendant's limited right
to production of police reports further weakens the Latimore court's
analysis.
8
The issues of admissibility and discovery are separate and distinct.'

42. 284 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1973).
43. Johnson's defense counsel had caused a subpoena duces tecum to issue, compelling
the police officer to produce his report at trial. After the officer testified on direct, defense counsel asked to examine the report. The trial court ruled that the report was
"not amenable to subpoena" and could not be used for purposes of impeachment. Id. at

199.
44. The supreme court set out the requirements for the "production and use in
evidence of police reports and statements for impeachment purposes by way of cross
examination or by placing in evidence." First, the "mere negative use" of a police report
normally should not be allowed. By "negative use" the court was referring to questions
as to why certain information stated in the officer's testimony was not included in his
report. An exception to this rule occurs when "some singular importance attach[es] to
the point in question, which goes to a material and critical fact in serious contention in
the trial." The general requirement is that
[t]he inquiry must be upon a crucial point and preferably upon a positive statement in such a report, which the witness at trial flatly refutes, thus placing his
credibility and the point involved in vital focus so that it becomes critical to the
defense.
284 So. 2d at 200.
Johnson equated the issue of production of the report at trial with that of admissibility. While it may seem logical to limit production at trial to information that would
be admissible, it is apparent that the defense must initially have access to the report in
order to meet the requirements of Johnson. The court sanctioned the use of in camera
proceedings in order to determine if the requirements are met and to protect sensitive
and irrelevant information. If the defense is to be denied access to the report until it has
been established that these requirements are met, the trial court will have the burden of
examining the report in camera to determine whether it is to be produced. This is
precisely the situation the United States Supreme Court sought to avoid in Jencks v.
United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). See note 16 supra. The federal cases interpreting the
Jencks Act have recognized that the scope of disclosure is not limited by a determination
that the information is admissible for purposes of impeachment, but that the decision of
whether a statement is useful for purposes of impeachment rests with the defendant. See,
e.g., United States v. Meisch, 370 F.2d 768, 772 (3d Cir. 1966). As a result of the difficulty
in meeting these restrictive requirements, Johnson may be limited to the appeal stage,
when the defense contends that the trial judge abused his discretion by denying production of a report.
45. 284 So. 2d at 201. See note 12 supra.
46. Federal cases interpreting the Jencks Act have recognized that the production of
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Limitations on admissibility for impeachment purposes, recognized by
the Johnson court and the Jencks Act, should not be determinative
when discovery is at issue. Once a trial is commenced the scope of production is reasonably limited to potentially admissible evidence, since
the discovery stage has been left behind.4 7 However, when the question
of pretrial discovery arises at an early stage in the proceedings, such as
in Latimore, there is no reason to limit the scope of discovery to that
information which would be admissible at trial, since the purpose of
discovery at that point is to gather all information relevant to the case
regardless of whether it would be admissible. Latimore's reliance on
the Jencks Act resulted in an unwarranted restriction of the scope of
pretrial criminal discovery.
Debate concerning criminal discovery traditionally has been framed
in terms of "what should fairly, and could safely, be given to the defense as an aid to preparing for trial." ' 4 In keeping with this principle,
discovery of police reports either has been totally denied or severely
restricted 49 in most jurisdictions. There are three traditional arguments
against broad pretrial criminal discovery: (1) discovery will lead to
perjury and the suppression of evidence; (2) it would be unfair to require the prosecution to disclose information when the defendant's
privilege against self-incrimination would preclude imposing a requirement of reciprocity; (3) a trial is an adversary proceeding and discovery
would upset the balance in favor of the defense. 50
In the past the Florida Supreme Court has inclined toward the
traditional, restrictive view of pretrial criminal discovery. That view
was reflected in State v. Crawford,5 1 quoted with approval by the Latimore court:
"On the other hand, the prosecuting attorney should not be required
to actively assist defendant's attorney in the investigation of the case.
statements and their admissibility are closely related but are separate questions. See, e.g.,
Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487, 493 n.7 (1963).
47. Although the scope of production at trial is necessarily limited, the defendant
must be afforded the opportunity to examine potentially admissible information in order
to determine its usefulness. See note 44 supra. An additional consideration arises, however, when the defendant waits until trial to request discovery; the prosecution may be
deprived of certain reciprocal discovery rights granted by FLA. R. CaIM. P. 3.220(b)(4).
48. ABA STAmARw 1.
49. See 14 ST. Louis U.L.J. 310-11 (1969).
50. See State v. Tune, 98 A.2d 881, 884-85 (N.J. 1953). See also United States v. Gars.
son, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923); State v. Rhoads, 91 N.E. 186 (Ohio 1910); Brennan,
The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 WM.s U.L.Q. 279,
289-90; Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CAL. L. REV. 56,

57-58 (1961).
51.

257 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1972).
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Discovery in criminal cases has tended to be heavily weighed in favor
of the defendant, and it would be contrary to the general principle
of advocacy, as well as fairness itself, to require the prosecuting attorney to perform any duties on behalf of the defendant in the
preparation of the case." 52
Crawford, however, was decided prior to the adoption of the present
discovery rule. In the recent decision of State v. Coney,53 the supreme
court indicated that its position may have become more progressive in
recognition of the purpose behind the new criminal discovery rules.
While adhering to its view that "'the whole idea of criminal pre-trial
discovery... is fairness,' "54 the court recognized that the Florida Rules
of Criminal Procedure are more "effective" than the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and implied that interpretation of the Florida
55
rules should not be limited by analogy to the federal rules. This decision casts further doubt on the Third District's use of the Jencks Act
in its interpretation of rule 3.220.
The traditional arguments against criminal discovery have been
rejected by a number of writers;58 moreover, those arguments concern
problems that can be dealt with in a more appropriate manner than by
denying the right of discovery to all defendants. The provisions of
rule 3.220 protect against the possible abuses of pretrial discovery that
underlie these arguments57 and at the same time preserve the de52. 284 So. 2d at 425, quoting from 257 So. 2d at 900.
53. 294 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 1973).

54. Id. at 87, quoting from State v. Coney, 272 So. 2d 550, 553 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1973) (emphasis omitted).
55. See 294 So. 2d at 86-87.
56. See, e.g., Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960); Krantz, Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases: A
Necessity for Fair and Impartial Justice, 42 NEB. L. REv. 127 (1962); Louisell, Criminal
Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CAL. L. REv. 56 (1961); Traynor, Ground
Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 228 (1964). See also Cash v.
Superior Court, 346 P.2d 407, 408-09 (Cal. 1959); State v. Tune, 98 A.2d 881, 894 (N.J.
1953) (Brennan, J., dissenting); ABA STANDARDS 1-3.
57. For example, subsection (a)(4) of rule 3.220 provides that the court may deny or
partially restrict disclosure of information if it finds there is a substantial risk that disclosure will result in perjury, bribery, harassment, intimidation or physical harm to
any person. This provision could be used in those few situations where there is danger
of perjury or suppression of evidence due to bribery or harassment of witnesses. Subsection (b) requires the defendant to make certain accommodations to the prosecution,
e.g., to be available for appearances in lineups and for reasonable physical examinations.
The defendant also may be required to disclose the names of witnesses that are expected
to be called and make other disclosures if the defense has demanded discovery under
other specified sections of rule 3.220. See FLA. R. Caim. P. 3.220(b)(4). Furthermore, rule
3.200 requires the defendant, upon demand by the prosecution, to give notice of any
intention to claim an alibi as a defense and the specific information by which he proposes
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fendant's right to discovery. In addition, the argument that discovery
would tilt the balance of criminal proceedings in favor of the defendant
has lost persuasiveness as the superior resources available to the prosecution for investigation have become apparent.58
If the position is taken that the purpose of rule 3.220 is to provide
for broad pretrial discovery, subject only to the restrictions imposed by
the rule itself, it may be argued that all reports compiled by police
officers which are relevant to the offense charged should be discoverable
under the rule. This liberal interpretation is consistent with both the
language and the purpose of the rule. In addition, such an interpretation is supported by constitutional considerations posed by the proponents of more liberal discovery of police reports59 and the policies
behind the broadening of criminal discovery in general.
The modern approach to the question of the scope of criminal discovery would focus not on the issue of fairness to the accused but rather
on the necessity for changes in criminal procedure. This is the approach
taken by the American Bar Association Advisory Committee on Pretrial Proceedings. 60 The Advisory Committee recognized the need for
changes in criminal procedure in order to "lend more finality to criminal dispositions, to speed up and simplify the process, and to make
more economical use of resources."61 The committee concluded that,
[i]n order to bring potential constitutional issues to the fore at the
earliest practical time and to make for appropriate and enduring dispositions, it seem[s] essential that defense counsel receive as much in2
formation about the case as feasible before trial or other disposition.6
to establish his alibi. From the foregoing, it is apparent that substantial reciprocity is
built into the rule.
58. See Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure,69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1172-73, 1192 (1960).
59. It has been suggested that the equal protection clause may require that an
indigent criminal defendant be afforded discovery of police reports in order to provide
the investigative aid necessary to adequately prepare his defense. See 14 ST. Louis U.L.J.
310, 316-20 (1969). Similarly, the due process clause has been said to require such discovery in order to satisfy the requirement of "fundamental fairness." Id. at 320. Closely
associated with these contentions is the suggestion that the sixth amendment right to
counsel requires more than mere appointment of counsel; adequate investigative aid is
also required in order to render that right meaningful. Note, Right to Aid in Addition

to Counsel for Indigent Criminal Defendants, 47 MINN. L. REv. 1054 (1963); 14 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 310, 320-22 (1969). These arguments recognize that the indigent defendant
has a need for investigative aid and that this need can be substantially satisfied by allowing the defendant to review the police reports compiled in connection with the offense charged.
60. See ABA STANDAwS 1-3.
61. See ABA STANDAwS 2.

62.

Id.
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There are three considerations underlying the committee's statements that seem to compel the broadening of pretrial criminal discovery. First, because of the widespread use of plea bargaining, which
8
now accounts for the majority of criminal dispositions, it may be constitutionally required that the defendant have access to all information
relevant to the offense charged to enable him to intelligently enter a
plea. 6' Secondly, in view of the general expansion of post-conviction
remedies,6 5 potential issues that could result in reversal or modification
on appeal should be presented and resolved at an early stage in the
criminal process in order to lend finality to criminal dispositions.
Finally, the economic realities involved in providing an indigent defendant with effective legal counsel should be considered. It is far less
costly to provide the defendant with the reports compiled in the State's
investigation than to staff and fund the public defender's office to the
extent necessary to provide for adequate investigation. Thus, in order
to promote judicial efficiency and to provide effective counsel, with
the least expense, the defendant should be granted broad pretrial criminal discovery rights. As stated by the Advisory Committee: "[B]road
pretrial disclosure of the prosecution's case [is] the key to satisfying
66
procedural objectives of overriding significance to criminal justice."1
In view of the most recent Florida Supreme Court pronouncements
on the availability of police reports to defendants, the changes in the
discovery rule and the policies supporting those changes, the Latimore
court's approach to the issue of pretrial discovery of police reports
clearly is retrogressive. At its next opportunity the supreme court
should consider the modern approach to pretrial criminal discovery,
and should effectuate fully the policies behind the new discovery rule
through an interpretation of "statement" that includes all police reports.
63. Id. See also Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. Rzv.
293, 316-19 (1960).
64. See Fletcher, supra note 63, at 316.
65. See ABA STANDARDS 2.
66. id.

